

## Message Text

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SECDEF WASHDC

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AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 1857

E. O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-79

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: CSCE: SENIOR POLADS AND MPT ADVISORS DISCUSS NEXT  
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL PREPARATORY TALKS ( MPT-4)

HELSINKI FOR USDEL MPT

SUMMARY: ZORIN'S LAST MINUTE ATTACK AT MPT-3 ON HUMAN CONTACTS  
HAS CLEARLY STRENGTHENED HAND OF ALLIES WHO FAVOR FIRM LINE  
AND CAUTIOUS PACE IN MPT-4. SEVERAL REPS EMPHASIZED THAT SOVIETS  
MUST MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS IN FREER MOVEMENT FIELD,  
SINCE HUMAN CONTACTS AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ISSUES  
WERE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR ALLIED INTEREST IN CSCE, AND  
FAVORED FACING THIS CONTROVERSY SQUARELY.

ITALY, PARTLY IN REACTION TO FRG'S MORE CONCILIATORY APPROACH,  
TOOK VERY HARD LINE AGAINST CONCESSIONS ON PRINCIPLES  
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GUIDING INTERSTATE RELATIONS. COMMITTEE ALSO DISCUSSED  
ECONOMIC ISSUES ( SEE USNATO 1825), MILITARY ASPECTS OF

SECURITY, MEDITERRANEAN ASPECTS, CONFERENCE FOLLOW- UP, SITES FOR THE CONFERENCE, AND FINANCING. IN GENERAL, ALLIES REAFFIRMED NATIONAL POSITIONS AND THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE OFFING. NAC WILL MEET APRIL 17 TO CONSIDER ASYGO SEND TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 30 TO MAY 18 AS OFFERED IN STATE 45209. CUSTOMS HAS ALSO FURNISHED NAMES OF, AND REQUESTED IN- COUNTRY TRAINING FOR, 25 CUSTOMS INVESTIGATORS WHO AFTER TRAINING WILL WORK FOR A TIME IN NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT.

4. WE ARE ADVISED THAT THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS HAS THE DETAILED COLOMBIAN CUSTOMS PLAN FOR NAROCOTICS ENFORCEMENT FOR FINAL REVIEW AND IS EXPECTED TO SUBMIT THE APPROVED DOCUMENT TO THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS COORDINATOR WITHIN THENEXT FEW DAYS. THE NARCOM HAS REVIEWED THIS PLAN AND WE BELIEVE IT TO BE SOUND AND REALISTIC AND ONE THAT CAN BE PUT INTO EFFECT PROMPTLY. LACK OF EQUIPMENT, HOWEVER, WOULD PROVE A LIMITING FACTOR AND WILL DEFINITELY SLOW THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION.

THE NARCOM IS CONFIDENT THAT THE EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED WILL BE FULLY UTILIZED PROMPTLY AND MAINTENANCE COULD BE ASSURED.

5. WE ALSO LEARN THAT GENERAL ORDONEZ, CHIEF OF DAS, HAS DECIDED TO APPOINT INSPECTOR GENERAL ALBERTO ROMERO AS HEAD OF THE DAS NARCOTICS EFFORT. THIS APPOINTMENT WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE ABOUT MAY1. PRIOR TO THE USG ANNOUNCED WAR ON DRUGS, MR. ROMERO WAS VIRTUALLY COLOMBIA' S ONE- MAN NARCOTICS FORCE. FOR SEVERAL YEARS HE COLLABORATED WITH BNDD AGENTS STATIONED IN PANAMA AND RENDERED VALUABLE SERVICE ON NUMEROUS CASES INCLUDING THE GRAN COLOMBIANA CASE. GENERAL ORDONEZ WE FEEL IS SLOWLY BUT SURELY REALIZING THAT PRES PASTRANA' S ADMINISTRATION INTENDS TO COLLABORATE WITH THE USG IN THE FIELD OF NARCOTICS INTERDICTION. HE HAS RECENTLY REMOVED TWO DAS OFFICIALS KNOWN TO HAVE COLLABORATED WITH NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS ( THOUGH THE SUSPECTED CAUSE FOR REMOVAL  
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HAS NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC). HE IS ALSO DEMONSTRATING A GREATER WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE MISSION ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE COLLECTION OF NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE.

6. FAIRLY RELIABLE THOUGH UNCONFIRMED STATISTICS ON THE INTERDICTION OF COCAINE IN COLOMBIA BY THE THREE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1972 SHOW DAS- 277 POUNDS; CUSTOMS- 121 POUNDS ( ALSO RENDERED ASSISTANCE TO DAS IN CONFISCATION OF 180 POUNDS); NATIONAL POLICE- 55 POUNDS. IT IS THE CONSENSUS OF THE NARCOM THAT ALL THREE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WILL INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY THE AMOUNTS OF CONFISCATED NARCOTICS

DURING THIS CALENDAR YEAR BUT IN ORDER TO BECOME EFFECTIVE, THEY MUST HAVE TRAINING AND MATERIEL ASSISTANCE FROM US.

7. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN VERY MUCH ASSISTED BY THE WILLINGNESS OF DAS IN THE " EXTRADITION" OF PRINCIPAL TRAFFICKERS WANTED IN THE U. S. THIS AVENUE OF COOPERATION IS MOST IMPORTANT. WE SHOULD NOT RUN THE RISK OF IT BEING CLOSED.

8. I HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE MURPHY- STEELE REPORT WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE COLOMBIAN PORTION. IN GENERAL I BELIEVE THAT THE REPORT IS ACCURATE AND WILL PROVE HELPFUL TO US.

9. IT IS TRUE AS MENTIONED IN THE MURPHY- STEELE REPORT THAT OUR COUNTRY TEAM HAS INFORMED THE GOC THAT REORGANIZATION AND RATIONALIZATION OF THEIR NARCOTICS EFFORT IS ESSENTIAL BEFORE THEY CAN EXPECT MATERIEL ASSISTANCE. I AM SATISFIED THAT WE HAVE MADE

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HERE. AS THE MURPHY- STEELE REPORT SAYS, " COLOMBIA NEEDS THE TOOLS TO GET THEIR ENDEAVORS UNDERWAY." I HAVE MADE A SUBSTANTIAL PERSONAL EFFORT IN CONVINCING COLOMBIAN GOVT OFFICIALS FROM THE PRES ON DOWN THAT THE BATTLE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TRAFFICKERS IS ONE ITEM OF PRIORITY WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVT. IF OUR VERY MODEST REQUEST TALLING \$320,000 FOR THE NATIONAL POLICE, \$80,000 FOR DAS AND \$55,500 FOR CUSTOMS IS NOT APPROVED, THE AUTHORITIES OF THESE RESPECTIVE AGENCIES WILL CONCLUDE THAT WHILE WE TALK AS THOUGH NARCOTICS INTERDICTION WERE

IMPORTANT TO US, IT IS NOT IMPORTANT ENOUGH FOR US TO DEVOTE RESOURCES TO ITS REALIZATION.

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10. THE OBJECTION MAY BE MADE THAT DAS, BECAUSE OF ITS CORRUPTION, AND CUSTOMS, BECAUSE OF ITS INEFFICIENCY, ARE NOT SUITABLE CANDIDATES FOR OUR ASSISTANCE. TO THIS I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE VERY NATURE OF THEIR BUSINESS MAKES THEIR COOPERATION ESSENTIAL. AND IF WE DENY THESE MODEST AMOUNTS TO THESE TWO GROUPS, WE MAY NOT ONLY BE FACED WITH A PASSIVE LACK OF COOPERATION BUT POSSIBLY ACTIVE OBSTRUCTIONISM THAT COULD VITIATE OUR TOTAL OVERALL EFFORT. THE NATIONAL POLICE CANNOT OPERATE ALONE; THEY MUST HAVE THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE OTHER ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. I BELIEVE THE FIGURES MENTIONED FOR MATERIEL ARE THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO INSURE THAT WE HAVE THE TOOLS FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE COOPERATION FROM ALL THREE AGENCIES.

1. ON THE APPOINTMENT OF THE NEW MINISTER OF JUSTICE, I PROPOSE TO REVIEW THE PROGRAM IN DEPTH, MAKE CLEAR OUR POSITION AND ENGAGE HIS FULL EFFORT. I SHOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE THE WHEREWITHALL IN HAND WHEN I DO SO.  
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6. PRINCIPLES. COMMITTEE AGREED THAT SOVIETS HAD MADE CLEAR IN MPT THAT SEPARATE PRINCIPLE ON INVOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS WAS PRIMARY SOVIET OBJECTIVE. ALLIED REPS WERE CLEARLY UNWILLING TO MAKE THIS CONCESSION TO SOVIETS, IF AT ALL, WITHOUT GETTING SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS IN RETURN. TO ASSESS THIS BALANCE OF CONCESSIONS, ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO VIEW MPT RESULTS " GLOBALLY," ALTHOUGH THEY SHOULD NOT TRY TO DEFINE PRECISELY VARIOUS POSSIBLE TRADE- OFFS.

7. IN PRINCIPLES MANDATE ITSELF, SOME FORM OF PACKAGE DEAL ACCEPTED BY ALL WOULD BE NECESSARY. AS OUTLINED BY FRG, PACKAGE WOULD INCLUDE SWISS ORDER OF PRINCIPLES ( I. E., PLACING INVOLABILITY AFTER NON- USE OF FORCE), LANGUAGE ON PEACEFUL CHANGE, A REFERENCE ( IF POSSIBLE) TO DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS, AND ADEQUATE LANGUAGE ON UNIVERSAL APPLICATION. IN ANY CASE, MOST REPS WANTED TO BE SURE THAT SOVIETS HAD MOVED SATISFACTORILY ON HUMAN CONTACTS BEFORE AGREEING

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TO SEPARATE LISTING OF INVOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS PRINCIPLE.

ALLIES WOULD NEED TO COORDINATE TACTICS CAREFULLY IN DECIDING WHEN AND HOW TO MOVE ON TNOVA AND EXECUTED TWO YEARS LATER FOR ESPIONAGE. HE WAS LAWYER BY PROFESSION AND THEY HAD ONE SON WHO NOW LIVING WITH DRAGANOVA. SECOND HUSBAND WHOSE NAME SHE NOW USES WAS BEST FRIEND OF FIRST HUSBAND AND ARRESTED AT SAME TIME. FIVE YEARS AFTER ARREST THEY WERE MARRIED AND AFTER HE HAD BEEN GRANTED PARDON. MARRIAGE ENDED IN DIVORCE FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER. HE AT PRESENT PRACTICING ARCHITECT IN BULGARIA. DIVORCE GRANTED ON HUSBAND'S INFIDELITY.

4. HAYDEN REQUESTS EMBASSY ADVISE WHEN AND IF HE SHOULD PROCEED TO SOFIA. AT PRESENT HE ON TWO- WEEK EASTER LEAVE BUT COULD TRAVEL TO SOFIA FOR THREE OR FOUR- DAY PERIOD AT ANY TIME DURING SUBSEQUENT SCHOOL SEMESTER.  
BUFFUM

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13. HUMAN CONTACTS. IN MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF HUMAN CONTACTS MANDATE ( BASKET III), UK REP REPORTED APRIL 10 CONVERSATION BETWEEN MENDELEVICH AND UK AMBASSADOR IN HELSINKI IN WHICH MENDELEVICH SAID THAT SOVIET POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT WAS FLEXIBLE. BRUNNER SAID FRG WAS FAVORABLY

IMPRESSED THAT ZORIN HAD EVEN MENTIONED FAMILY REUNIFICATION. SINCE SOVIETS HAD TOLD FRG REPEATEDLY IN BILATERALS THAT THEY WOULD NEVER ACCEPT INCLUSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN BASKET III. FRG ALSO PLEASED THAT SOVIETS HAD INCLUDED REFERENCE TO "EXISTING LAWS" ONLY IN MEASURE ON TRAVEL AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION.

14. FERRARIS RESPONDED THAT IT WAS WISHFUL THINKING TO FIND ANY FLEXIBILITY IN SOVIET POSITION. SOVIETS HAD HARSHLY REJECTED WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR INCREASED HUMAN CONTACTS. ALLIES ARE WALKING A FINE LINE: THEY HAVE RETREATED ENOUGH ALREADY IN THIS AREA AND FURTHER CONCESSIONS WOULD ONLY  
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MERGE HUMAN CONTACTS WITH "CULTURAL COOPERATION." HE AGREED FULLY WITH NORWEGIAN, BELGIAN, AND DUTCH REPS WHO SAID THAT ALLIES MUST NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT ANY SOVIET ESCAPE CLAUSES IN "CHAPEA KASTL'S SUMMARY (SEPTTEL) OF SENIOR POLADS DISCUSSION, AT WHICH TIME WE SHOULD HAVE A FURTHER INDICATION OF ANY NEW TRENDS IN POSTURE OF EC-9. END SUMMARY.

1. SENIOR POLADS HAD COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION APRIL 11 AND 12 ON RESULTS OF MPT-3 AND PLANNING FOR MPT-4. ALSO PRESENT WERE SENIOR ADVISORS FROM MOST ALLIED DELEGATIONS TO MPT, INCLUDING HERPIN (BELGIUM), SHENSTONE (CANADA), BRUNNER (FRG), FERRARIS (ITALY), VAN DER VALK (NETHERLANDS), MEVIK (NORWAY), AND VEST (US). MOST REPS SPOKE FAVORABLY OF HIGH DEGREE OF ALLIED COORDINATION AND COHESION IN MPT-3, DESPITE CERTAIN DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN ALLIED GROUP ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. FURTHER HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSION FOLLOW BELOW.

2. TACTICS AND TIMING. NOTING ZORIN'S FIRM STATEMENTS ON APRIL 3 AND 4 AGAINST UNACCEPTABILITY OF INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF MARRIAGE CONDITIONS, FAMILY TRAVEL AND EMIGRATION IN HUMAN CONTACTS MANDATE, MOST REPS BELIEVED THAT ALLIES SHOULD STRESS IN BILATERAL CONTACTS AND IN MPT-4 STRONG IMPORTANT THEY ATTACH TO CONCRETE PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. ITALY EVEN SUGGESTED THAT ALLIES TAKE THEIR CASE TO THE PUBLIC, ALTHOUGH NORWAY, CANADA, AND US CONSIDERED THAT BALANCE OF ADVANTAGES LAY IN RETAINING CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF MPT. BRUNNER SAID THAT FRG PLANNED TO RAISE HUMAN CONTACTS ISSUES WITH BREZHNEV DURING HIS VISIT TO BONN AND TO STICK CLOSELY TO ALLIED POSITION.

3. CANADA AND PORTUGAL SUPPORTED BENELUX AND ITALIAN ARGUMENT THAT ALLIES MUST CONTINUE TO PLACE HEAVY EMPHASIS ON CAREFUL PREPARATION FOR CSCE AND MAKE CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT ALLIES WILL NOT MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS, PARTICULARLY IN HUMAN CONTACTS FIELD, SIMPLY TO MEET A "DEADLINE." THEY BELIEVED THAT ALLIED FIRMNESS WOULD ENCOURAGE SOVIETS TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS. US, FRANCE, UK AND NORWAY AGREED THAT ALLIES

SHOULD STRESS IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN CONTACTS AND KEEP PRESSURE  
ON SOVIETS TO MODIFY THEIR POSITION, BUT THEY ALSO BELIEVED  
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ALLIES SHOULD RETURN TO MPT-4 WITH "PEN IN HAND," READY TO BEGIN  
SERIOUS DRAFTING.

4. IN LENGTHY STATEMENT OF HIS POSITION, DUTCH REP SAID THAT  
THERE WAS A MIDDLE APPROACH BETWEEN POSTPONING CSCE MINISTERIAL  
AND OFFERING SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS IN AN EFFORT TO MEET  
JUNE DATE. MIDDLE GROUND WOULD BE TO DEFINE CLEARLY WHAT  
ARE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR WEST ( E. G., IN HUMAN CONTACTS  
FIELD) IN DETERMINING " SATISFACTORY" RESULTS AND USE THIS  
YARDSTICK AS BASIS FOR FINAL DECISION. HE BELIEVED THAT  
MARGIN FOR WEST BETWEEN A SATISFACTORY AND AN INDIFFERENT  
RESULT WAS SMALL AND THAT, IN ANY CASE, A " SATISFACTORY"  
OUTCOME WOULD ONLY BE A VERY MODEST BEGINNING ALONG A LONG  
ROAD TO A CHANGED SITUATION IN EUROPE. TO PRESERVE SATISFACTORY  
MINIMUM, ALLIES SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO ACCEPT FORMULATIONS  
WHICH COVER OVER DIFFICULTIES. ( BRUNNER ADDED THAT WEST SHOULD  
ENSURE THAT MANDATES ARE CAREFULLY FORMULATED SO THAT THE " DICE  
ARE NOT LOADED" AGAINST ALLIES AT THE OUTSET OF THIS LONG  
JOURNEY.)

5. DUTCH REP AGREED WITH COMMENTS OF US AND SEVERAL  
OTHERS THAT ALLIES SHOULD BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT USING  
BRACKETS, SINCE THIS COULD PROVIDE AN EASY WAY OUT FOR  
SOVIETS TO GET CONFERENCE WITHOUT HAVING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS  
AND TO ENGAGE IN SPLITTING TACTICS DURING MINISTERIAL MEETING.  
NONETHELESS, HE BELIEVED THAT SOME BRACKETS MIGHT BE NECESSARY  
AT THE VERY END OF MPT-4 TO ENSURE THAT AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT  
ARE CLEARLY RECORDED. FRENCH REP SAID HE WOULD PREFER VAGUE  
FORMULATIONS TO USE OF BRACKETS. US SAID IT WAS LIKELY THAT  
ALL SUBJECTS WOULD PROCEED TOGETHER, AS THEY HAD AT END OF  
MPT-4, AND ALLIES SHOULD AVOID " ALPHONSE- GASTON" SITUATION.

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**TAGS:** PFOR  
**To:** STATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
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